Introduction
The concept o f participation has broadened in the past twenty years. Debate on the highly diversified forms o f autonomy, cooperation and control within work organizations has enriched the sociological approach to participation after the initial and often simplified concepts o f direct employee participation in deci sion-making. These advances oblige us to pay careful attention to new develop ments in the labour process, not just to test achievements in already-known dimensions and to measure results according to already-accepted theories of employee participation. In radically changing social situations, sociologists face a more difficult -but also more challenging -task, not only in confronting the new reality with existing paradigms but in identifying emerging phenomena or fresh combinations o f former and recent features o f social development.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, in Central and Eastern Europe, there were widespread illusions as to the prospects o f labour relations and the new role o f employees and their interest associations. The international, economic and so cial conditions o f the real processes o f social transformation in these countries, however, framed events differently. The new institutions o f labour relations and social cooperation displayed unexpected patterns, and social scientists are now seeking to understand the motives and intentions o f the social partners within the transformation process. Since the social and economic context o f the current transformation process varies from country to country in this region, very dif ferent strategies and practices o f institution-building, combined with national and local traditions o f interest representation and participation, are creating a rich variety o f labour relations. The theme o f this paper -namely participationis an integrated part o f the complex system o f labour relations. But this integra tion, in its form, contents and importance has never been homogeneous in the countries o f this region and it has always exhibited obvious system-specific characteristics.
The Role o f Participation in the Labour Relations System
In principle, the following institutions -each o f which has its own social and political weight -constitute elements o f the autonomous system o f labour rela tions (Hethy, 1991 ):
• The system o f national-level tri-(bi)partite negotiations (In Hungary the Na tional Council o f Reconciliation o f Interests, NCRI, was established as early as 1988).
• The system o f collective bargaining between autonomous partners. Given the lack o f autonomy o f the partners, the earlier firm-level system o f agreements cannot be considered to be collective bargaining, although it ensured a cer tain degree o f consensus between management and employees, both o f which, however, had dependent status.
• The institution o f collective labour action, which was non-existent in these countries, with the exception o f Poland and Hungary, until 1989-90.
• Employee participation took various forms in the region. One version was the system o f union representatives (as in the former Soviet Union); another was so-called 'direct participation' (like the self-management system in ex-Yugo slavia, or the Enterprise Councils which have functioned in Hungary since the mid 1980s). A third version was based on the increased autonomy of employees and their groups in work organizations (considered as indepen dent actors in firm s' internal labour markets), examples being the economic working associations -"VGMK"-in Hungary or the autonomous work bri gades o f Bulgaria in the 1980s. Naturally, these three versions o f employee participation could also coexist, thereby creating special mixes.
All four institutions o f labour relations listed above have a rationale and tradi tions which have influenced the functioning o f the others. In certain periods, one institution has substituted for others or they have exchanged roles. For in stance, the already substantial experience o f tripartite negotiations has estab lished norms for firm-level agreements in the absence o f a well-developed sys tem o f collective bargaining. Or direct participation by employees in manage ment may have partially replaced the still immature practice o f labour action. The autonomous system o f labour relations has its political, legal and eco nomic dimensions. National level negotiations comprise mechanisms which connect labour relations to political decision-making (government, unions, em ployers and union organizations, parliament, etc.). The economic and social structures underpinning the substantive rules o f the various markets are expressed in the system o f collective bargaining. The legal regulation o f collective bar gaining and labour disputes link the system o f labour relations to the national system o f jurisdiction.
Participation is a field in which individual as well as collective action, eco nomic interests as well as self-realization, interweave. The seemingly 'softest' institutions o f labour relations comprise a scenario in which employees react to ongoing technological, organizational, financial and labour market developments in their sector. In this sphere, the patterns o f everyday workplace cooperation are constantly reformulated in the light o f new individual and collective experi ences. In influencing the decision-making process, in solving technical or orga nizational problems, in manipulating human relations, and in expressing inter ests, people not only construct their working life but create the basic conditions for social, economic and cultural reproduction. None o f the economic reforms o f the past decade could have succeeded if they had not taken account o f this fact; and nor can the current transformation process ignore the complex web o f relations among these micro-worlds.
The Forms and Dimensions of Participation
Employees may participate in their firm 's decisions at different levels: they may express their opinions and interests at the level o f their immediate workplace, workshop or office, and at higher managerial levels. This dimension o f partici pation corresponds to a decision-making system which may or may not provide room for differing degrees o f employee involvement in a firm 's affairs.
Another dimension o f participation is the closeness o f involvement in the firms' managerial and decision-making system, ranging from the exchange o f information, through official respect for the employees' opinions in decisions, to codetermination. These types o f involvement may be officially regulated by laws and agreements or by social practice and traditions. These latter may some times be more influential than legal regulations, although their combined effects vary from country to country, and also according to the context o f managerial systems or o f local, branch, firm-level practices. From the employees' point o f view, the intensity o f their involvement may be characterized by other catego ries as well. Occasional participation or the expression o f opinions in support o f colleagues, unions or managers represent an intensity o f involvement at a lower level than regular contributions in the form o f organized action or the accep tance o f official responsibilities (membership o f works councils, union repre sentation) within the decision-making process.
As regards the aims o f participation, a distinction is drawn between problems relating to working conditions and strategic issues. A similar approach, though one more differentiated in its sociological character, is adopted when task-and power-oriented participation are distinguished.
All the above-listed dimensions may take the form o f direct or indirect (rep resentative) participation. Indirect participation is exercised through various interest-representing associations (unions, works' or enterprise councils, bodies supervising pension and health funds, etc.). Direct participation takes a wide variety o f forms in the world. There are the forums and institutions o f communi cation between management and employees, ranging from quality circles to regu lar workshop conferences on production issues, innovations or on working con ditions. Since the 1970s, important initiatives have been undertaken in this area following the new human resource management approach. Direct employee par ticipation may take place through such organizational arrangements as 'assem bly cells', 'working islands', 'modules', internal subcontracting groups (like the Hungarian VGMK in the 1980s), where employees shape their everyday work ing practices and, in the longer term, the patterns o f cooperation and power relations within the labour process.
Property partnership and financial engagement in the maintenance o f em ployment is regarded as a special form o f employee participation. The American ESOP schemes are the most well-known examples. But the various forms of MBO, the Hungarian MRP (a version o f the American model), various com pany stock ownership systems, the East Central European coupon-based em ployee ownership system, or other direct forms o f property-sharing, also belong to this category o f participation. The objectives behind the creation o f these types o f employee participation vary from the economic to the social. Whatever the intentions may be, the safeguarding o f employment, the broadening o f fi nancial resources, the creation o f closer employee identification with the firm, and property-sharing can be achieved in very different organizational and mana gerial settings. Day-to-day participation practices within such firms do not auto matically increase with financial participation by their employees.
4 The Role and Importance of Participation in the Hungarian Labour Relations System
In Hungary, the various components o f the labour relations system have devel oped unevenly over past decades. In the previous political context, ideological and political limits were set on the development o f the first three o f the abovementioned components. All three areas -the creation o f national level tri-or bipartite negotiations and the institutionalization o f collective bargaining, as well as o f labour disputes -were not tolerated by the still monolithic political system. However, there was always the need to create social consensus in the workplace level which favoured the development o f various forms o f employee participation in Hungary. The motives were very different, ranging from man agement interest in cooperation with the rank-and-file, through the adaptation and diffusion o f new m anagerial techniques, the ideologically m otivated endeavour to humanize the workplace with especial emphasis on identification with the firm, to politically motivated attempts to introduce so-called self-man agement schemes in order to counterbalance growing managerial power. (These last-mentioned motives were especially visible in the 1980s as the political forces attempted to maintain control over the emerging technocrats and union bureau cracies who, often in coalition with managers, successfully influenced redistri bution processes against the centralizing efforts o f the national political and economic actors.) These concepts, the desire to realize them, and the life-span o f the different forms o f participation, were subject to interaction among differ ent social forces at the firm and national level. Both forms o f employee participation -the direct and the representative (in direct) -were widespread in the Hungarian system. The most important direct forms were experimentation with autonomous working units, group-level deci sions on wage distribution, group-based cost-saving centres, internal subcon tracting systems, and the widespread and highly publicized working associa tions (VGMK) o f the 1980s. The growing role o f union representation -as ex pressed through the various shop steward and firm-level union committees after the mid-1970s, together with the creation o f enterprise councils as self-govern ing bodies in the second half o f the 1980s -was the most significant develop ment in indirect participation. Having gradually obtained their participation and bargaining rights, the unions were anxious to see how other direct forms of employee participation and non-union representation could be implemented. They were afraid o f losing their newly-acquired functions (o f the 1970s) in employee representation, which was a well-known component o f labour-relations systems in the industrialized countries. In Hungary, the unions' position was more problematic, since they were still in a politically dependent position until 1989, and they felt threatened after the 1970s by non-union-controlled representation and direct participative forms, and by new managerial techniques to create direct channels o f communication with the employees.
Research has shown that employee participation was a key element in Hun garian labour relations after the 1970s. In its different forms it partially substi tuted for the autonomous institution o f collective bargaining and labour dis putes, and, together with informal mechanisms o f interest conciliation, helped to stabilize the work process while creating enduring cooperation between the partners at the firm level. (The tight labour market situation and the organiza tional problems generated by the shortage economy strengthened the informal power position o f the work groups who played a crucial role in solving them.) Increased opportunities for firm-level participation after the 1970s enabled cer tain employee groups to accumulate important social skills in the evaluation and manipulation o f social and organizational situations, in negotiation with differ ent social partners, and in the elaboration o f overviews o f enterprises and their environment. These experiences directed attention to the limits o f participation, and they highlighted the missing elements o f the labour relations system which were hindering the expansion and more efficient use o f firm-level participative schemes.
Changes in the Role and Place of Participation within the Labour Relations System since 1989
Since 1988/89, in Hungary -somewhat earlier than political transformation it self -the system o f labour relations has been reformed. Labour relations have developed into an autonomous system as the social partners, employers and employees and their interest-representing organizations, have gained indepen dence from other political and economic organizations. The roles o f the main actors in the labour relations system have been clarified, and they have acquired the right to negotiate with each other as well as with the government. Legisla tion (the new Labour Code, the Employment Act, etc.) has regulated their sphere o f action and the different institutions o f negotiating, bargaining and the collec tive solution o f labour disputes. Recognition o f the social partners' indepen dence has given rise to the pluralization o f the competing interest-representing organizations, so that new unions and employer organizations have been bom. At the national level, a Council o f Interest Reconciliation was created in 1988 to negotiate and agree on wage increases and social and employment issues prior to parliamentary debate. These innovations in the labour relations system have been especially impor tant in a situation o f overall changes in the Hungarian economy. The compre hensive transformation o f property relations, the privatization o f public firms, together with the emerging new private sector, the decentralization o f many o f the former large organizations and the profound economic recession -these have been the main factors o f economic transformation. In circumstances o f unstable economic conditions and the huge social costs o f transformation met by large groups, the above-described new elements in labour relations helped to main tain stability and sometimes even to resolve critical situations o f unrest.
At the same time, firm-level participation seemed to lose its importance. There were (and still are) certain commentators who expected firm-level negotiations and bargaining (formal or informal) to diminish in importance under pressure from the new phenomenon o f a high level o f employment. Others supposed that private property and capitalist management would 'im port' the well-known methods o f firm-level negotiations which 'manufactured consensus'.
Apart from these assumptions (that I shall attempt to refute later on), the place o f participation in the Hungarian labour relations system has certainly changed. It has lost its political and ideological significance (local employeremployee conflicts can hardly be transposed into basic social contradictions), and its functions with regard to to firm-level issues have became more circum scribed. In the meantime, the social and political positions o f the partners have been re-established at the firm level due to various factors: the appearance o f direct private property, the definitive disappearance o f the 'mythologies' o f work and the 'class approach', declining production because o f the deepening reces sion, and the new institutions and legal measures enabling decisions or protest to be influenced at the firm level. However, it would be an over-simplification of the situation to state that these new rights have been acquired by employees in a historical period in which they have lost their real bargaining strength under pressure from the labour market and the recession.
Employee groups in a strong position within firms can still be found, despite dismissals and unemployment. Even with increased unemployment, productiv ity has fallen, demonstrating the survival o f low requirements. The high social costs o f transformation and the lowering o f living standards have been tolerated, and the strike rate has been low in the past few years. Some strikes have been desperate revolts against the 'non-cooperative' management o f workers in mar ginal sectors and positions, while others have been mounted by powerful em ployee groups in order to improve their pay and working conditions.
A view widely accepted among labour relations experts is that, in periods o f recession, when unemployment increases the number o f strikes diminishes. This is taken to be a sign o f the weak bargaining positions o f employees and their unions. In this respect, Hungary seems to be no exception. While in the 1980s there were widespread fears among Hungarian (and other Central East Euro pean) political and social scientists that a fall in living standards accompanied by a retreat from full employment would lead to social unrest, this has not been the case in these first years o f the transformation period. The number o f strikes, participants in them and the total o f days lost through strikes, have all remained low in Hungary, thereby testifying to the validity o f the above 'rule' on the lower level o f open and manifest conflict circumstantiated by formally weak ened bargaining positions. At the same time, doubts may be raised concerning the differentiated bargaining positions o f workers still in employment. In Hun gary, where the majority o f the jobless are long-term unemployed and hundreds o f thousands are in casual employment, these facts show that those who man aged to keep their jobs in the first waves o f lay-offs and workplace closures, are considered necessary for the stabilization and possible recovery o f their firms.
I now briefly describe a case which shows that there is no direct relationship between a given labour market situation and the employees' bargaining posi tion.
A Managerial Initiative Rejected
The 'D ' Co. Ltd. was created at the beginning o f 1992 as a joint venture with two-thirds Hungarian and one-third foreign ownership. H alf o f the company's products are sold on international markets. The foreign proprietors took over key positions in management and launched a new human resources strategy for the firm. Together with the Hungarian representative o f the management, they were convinced that it was sufficient to give the blue-collar workers somewhat higher wages and better working conditions compared to the firms operating in the local labour market and management could rely on a satisfied workforce. When establishing the joint venture, the mixed management signed an agree ment with the local union which guaranteed employment and the level o f the firm 's social benefits.
The principal objective o f the new management was to maintain and increase the company's market share through improved quality. For this purpose they introduced a 'knowledge centred' incentive system which replaced the former one in which low-skilled workers received better wages than their highly quali fied colleagues. This innovation was linked with the introduction o f the new 'Quality Insurance System', which required the support o f the workers, o f their unions, o f lower level supervisors, and o f middle level managers.
Despite the efforts o f the new management, higher wages, better working conditions and stable employment, there was no significant improvement in productivity, in product quality, or in the level o f morale among the workers and within the firm as a whole. The following factors were apparently responsible for low morale. There were exaggerated expectations among the company's shopfloor workers o f radical wage increases; indeed, that Hungarian wages would soon reach the Austrian level. This 'dream' was fuelled during preparatory ne gotiations o f the planned joint venture by some o f the Hungarian managersprobably in order to ensure the workers' support. Austrian wages, in fact, are extremely high -six to ten times higher -when linked with productivity and product quality, but otherwise 'only' one and a half or two times higher than Hungarian wages. The other reasons for low morale lay outside the blue-collar worker's community and within management. After the creation o f "D" Co. Ltd., the new top management o f the Hungarian-Austrian joint venture intro duced a management style based on the 'autocratic' version. From a technical point o f view, these decisions were well prepared and elaborated. But they lacked the participation not only o f the workers and unions but also o f the middle managers, who had played an important role in the decision-making process o f the former publicly-owned firm but were now entirely excluded from the deci sions taken by top management. Thus, this important sector o f management could not and did not identify with the firm 's management decisions. In this type o f decision-making system, both blue collar workers and managers are merely 'executors', they are not 'co-creators' o f the firm's policy aimed at chang ing the incentive system, quality assurance, and to introduce a new practice of manpower use. The management o f "D" Co. Ltd. first made an appropriate di agnosis: they thought that the lack o f cooperation between workers and manag ers was the result o f communication difficulties. To overcome this human rela tions problem, the management introduced an open policy initiative by asking the workers to inform them about their interests and the topics that they wished to read about in the com pany's newspaper. In order to collect the workers' opin ions on managerial initiatives, "sealed mail boxes" were placed in each work shop in "D" Co. Ltd. Two months later, before publication o f the next issue o f the company's newspaper, the manager responsible for communication between management and the rank-and-file attempted to gather the workers' opinions. But the overall results o f the campaign were as follows: "Three blank slips o f paper and a pigeon feather". After this complete failure o f its initiative to im prove communication and open dialogue with the workers, the management realized that, within its ranks, the middle managers were more on the side o f the workers than o f top management. The trade-union plant-level organization pur sued a policy o f 'confrontation' with the top management's initiatives and, in this respect, the middle managers supported union action against management. In the absence o f overall consensus between rank-and-file, middle managers and top management, the employees refused a minor offer by the management for participation and applied pressure to influence wider issues o f working con ditions. If one examines not only certain isolated phenomena o f participation or non-participation (refusal to participate) but also the dynamics o f "everyday workplace events" and continuous changes in the relationships between the part ners, one finds that employees realized their interests through both open and hidden forms o f participation.
After the failure o f the above-mentioned managerial campaign to improve communication with the workforce, shop-floor workers and middle managers achieved success in various important areas -for instance, by signing the first Collective Agreement o f June 1994. The top managers -or key figures in the company's executive management -were forced to recognize the necessity of building the social consensus o f their partners. Establishing stable agreement with the workers and the unions would identify not only the interest-and powerrelations among the workers and between the workers and the trade union but also within the management. With regard to this latter aspect, it was crucial to realize that the 'malaise' o f the middle managers was due their lack o f participa tion in the firm 's decision-making process. The initial diagnosis identified the tensions between managers and workers as psychological in character (misun derstandings, difficulties o f communication, etc.). However, after a one-and-ahalf year 'learning process', management discovered the true nature o f the prob lem: that is, the key role o f interests and power relations. It became obvious that the 'core workers' (and the union leaders) or the middle managers would not voluntarily practice self-restraint or give up their 'strong positions' in the decision-making system created in the former state company. Within this social con text, the rejection o f the management's proposed form o f participation -collec tion o f workers' suggestions and their publication in the company newspaperis understandable. The different forms o f employee participation (the voicing of opinions in the newspaper, w ork's council since 1993, etc.) are an important component o f firm-level labour relations. However, these participatory instru ments cannot substitute for collective bargaining or social consensus based on the concertation o f interests and power among the social partners. In this regard, it is worth noting that collective bargaining and labour disputes are the best known system o f short-term interest conciliation between the employer and employees. The role and function o f participation are also linked to interest relations and power relations, but from a long-term rather than short-term per spective (Gabor Furedi (1994). 7 Combining 'Voice' and 'Loyalty'
In a situation o f profound crisis between the social partners in a firm, participa tion can substitute -temporarily -for collective bargaining. In the case o f 'C ' Co. Ltd., which operated in the textiles industry, a seemingly paradoxical situa tion has been described: resistence and strong protest combined with coopera tive participation. (Orolin, 1994) 'C ' Co.Ltd. was established in the autumn o f 1990, with 50% Hungarian and 50% Italian capital. The objective o f Italians was both to acquire markets and to gain long-term profit based on low wages. (At present the average wage in 'C ' Co. Ltd. is a little more than one-eighth o f the average in the Italian plants o f the foreign investors.) The priorities o f the Italian owners can be summed up as follows: order, discipline, quality and profit. Within an extremely short period o f time, the workforce was cut to 30%. Before privatization, 1000 workers pro duced 80,000 metres per day o f different textiles. In the new Italian-Hungarian firm, this quantity was produced in a month by the 300 workers that remained.
In parallel with this decline in employment and production, the influence o f the former trade union was eroded. The changes in the ownership structure resulted not only in an increased intensity o f work and slow wage growth increase but also, surprisingly, in badly organized work and worsening working conditions. Preparation for the privatization o f the former state textile (weaving mill) com pany was carried out in a "climate o f secrecy" : nobody was informed about the privatization plan. The employees therefore thought that everything was against them. In everyday factory life, the 'Italian trainers' treated the Hungarian textile workers as 'third rate workers' and showed no respect for them: even joking and chatting were prohibited during working hours. After two and a half years of unsuccessful attempts by the workers to reach collective agreement on job clas sification and wage increases -in an industry in which male workers were paid the lowest industrial wage -the workers staged a 'warning strike' in October 1993, and later a longer strike in December o f the same year. (The degree o f support for the strike was 90% in the plant situated in the capital, and 100 % in the plant operating in a regional centre.) Despite the strikes, the Italian ownerswho during the two and a half years had increased their property share and had become the dominant owner -finally agreed to a 12% basic wage increase and an 8% quality bonus (premium), but they did not sign the collective agreement.
To understand the economic performance o f "C" Co. Ltd. one must bear in mind its huge indebtedness (100 million Ft) due to the shrinking market. In this situation, the very survival o f the firm was at stake. The workers were strongly aware o f the firm 's imminent bankruptcy: for them, the real threat was not the signing o f the collective agreement but the survival o f the firm and hence the saving o f their jobs. The situation was aggravated by the constant violation o f the Hungarian labour code by the Italian director -who was unaware o f Hungar ian law regulating labour relations. Even in these circumstances o f conflictual labour relations, the workers participating in the strike expressed their commit ment to and strong identification with the firm. This emerges clearly on reading extracts from the 'm em o' drawn up by the W orker's Assembly during the warn ing strike:
"Beyond the disorganization o f work, there are numerous deficiencies and mistakes in the techno logical instructions for which the worker's collective cannot take responsibility. Employees, guided by professional self-esteem and by the risk o f losing their jobs in the case of plant closure due to bankruptcy, tried to warn the decision-makers o f the Co. Ltd. in time to avoid damage caused by the inappropriate technological instructions. The worker's assembly cannot accept and rejects the Ital ian organizers' often abusive behaviour towards the workers ..." (Orolin, 1994: p . ) .
Hence workers' participation in this case has a twofold character. On the one hand there is strong protest which even takes the form o f strikes for agreement to be reached on the most important issues o f working conditions, employment and wages. On the other, workers constantly participate in solving the techno logical and organizational difficulties o f the plant.
Those forms o f participation consisting o f strong protest or a rejection of managerial initiatives, and the forceful representation o f employee interests, may give rise to formal collective labour disputes. With reference to alreadymentioned elements o f Hungarian labour relations, we may say that employee participation may either provoke or prevent the escalation o f labour disputes into strikes. The distinctive feature o f Hungarian labour relations is the low level o f strike activity compared with the other countries undergoing transfor mation in Central and Eastern Europe.
According to the research report compiled by the Phare Project Fact Finding Committee in 1993, which examined different forms o f participation and com pared views and interests, in many cases the threat o f strike action leads to the settlement o f conflicts. In 30% o f cases, formal strike calls were not followed by strikes, and peaceful solutions were found instead. In particular, broader and branch-wide strikes (for instance in the railway or the electricity generating sectors) were prevented by agreements reached after the strike had been called. As collective labour disputes were being prepared, the social partners conducted intensive negotiation, either directly or through their representatives, in order to establish the pre-conditions for further cooperation. In 1993, eleven branchlevel wage agreements were reached, covering 5% o f all the employees. Alto gether, around 16% o f the labour force was affected by such agreements (Berki, 1994) .
In some o f the multinationals to have established plants in Hungary (in the form o f 'green field' investments), different forms o f employees resistance have led to important wage agreements and to the establishment o f the first smaller local unions, thereby emphasising the importance o f the works' councils. The labour relations system o f the multinationals operating in Hungary modulates between their national traditions, international contexts and Hungarian devel opment (Neuman, 1993). 8 Changes Towards a Three-dimensional System of Participation
As a new element in the changing labour relations system since 1993, especial mention should be made o f the works' councils. These are institutions which provide representation for the entire workforce; and they have had several pre decessors in Hungary: in 1918 Hungary: in -19, between 1945 Hungary: in and 1948 Hungary: in , in 1956 , and in different revolutionary periods as institutions ensuring workers' control when managerial influence has weakened. Despite obvious differences in social, eco nomic and historical circumstances, several common institutional features can be discerned in their reappearance and functioning:
• Workers' councils were created in revolutionary situations when the tradi tional institutions o f political democracy were paralysed, and when radical changes in property relations had created a vacuum and instability in man agement.
• This form o f workers ' self-management was designed to integrate the contra dictory roles o f employers and employees. The intention was to defend the employees' interests (as with any traditional union) while taking over mana gerial responsibilities (in organizing production). In 1919, for example, work ers ' councils were responsible for labour discipline, defence o f socialized property, and production control.
• These councils have never restricted their action to the firm level, but seek to establish ties both horizontally and vertically in order to gain political control over the national economy: partly because o f their ambitious and contradic tory aims and partly in order to stabilize the political, social and managerial institutions, i.e. parliament, unions, private and public property (Varga, 1989) .
In 1992, the Labour Code prescribed the creation o f works' councils as obliga tory in all firms in order to ensure employee participation in work-related deci sions. W orks' councils were to be elected in firms with more than fifty employ ees -and works' delegates in smaller firms with more than fifteen employeesby secret ballot for a three-year period. The candidates were to be nominated by the unions or other groups o f employees. These councils have the following rights:
• co-determination o f the firm 's social welfare decisions;
• the expression o f employees' opinions on managerial decisions concerning reorganization, privatization, the use o f human resources, vocational training and retraining, new working methods, and so on; • information provided at least twice a year on the firm 's economic situation, on investments, wages, liquidity, etc. At the same time, these councils cannot organize and support strikes. Besides participation in interest representation and bargaining through the unions, the works' councils in their present form can be regarded as a second institution for employee participation. The mandatory system has certain simi larities to those in other countries (like Germany or Austria) with a so-called 'dual system ' o f labour relations. It is expected to develop social norms and rules o f the game for long-term conflict resolution between the social partners at the firm level. The outcome o f these rules may foster cooperation between em ployers and employees and among their different groups.
Owing to the short life o f the works' councils, it would be premature to evaluate their activity. The first ballot in 1993 redefined the representativeness o f the different union confederations. O f the eight trade union federations, MSZOSZ received 71%, the Autonomous Unions 18%, and the Democratic League of Independent Unions 6%, o f votes during the works' councils elections. There are signs that trade unions consider the works' councils to be their rivals in influencing decision-making at the firm level. This is due to the as yet incom plete divison o f labour between the two institutions which would formally sepa rate bargaining and cooperation.
Mention should finally be made o f a new element in employee participation as a social product o f spreading innovative managerial techniques in the field of human resources. In the vacuum o f labour relations immediately after political trasformation, the need for everyday communication and problem-solving has over-ridden direct relations between management and employees' groups (see the above case o f the Austro-Hungarian firm). Moreover, the transfer o f West ern managerial skills and systems is one o f the most visible and urgent chal lenges faced by the Hungarian economic elite, given the growing influence of Western and multinational firms. Various forms o f teamwork, 'lean' and 'flat ter' organizations, the establishment o f more 'heterarchic relations' within or ganizations, the reorganization o f firm s' newspapers and bulletins, group dis cussions, are all on the list o f new managerial initiatives. (Mako Cs. -Novoszath P. 1994.) Privatization, productive decentralization, the crisis o f the redistributive mecha nisms, the diminishing possibilities o f 'concession policy', the pluralization of employee and employer organizations -all these individually and collectively constitute a challenge for Hungarian labour relations. Not by chance, the social partners have been pressing for a 'social pact' since 1990.
At the national level, there is a strong need to stabilize social relations through centralized agreements. But at the firm level, despite the relatively high unem ployment rate and economic recession, high quality performance, problem-solv ing, adaptability, cannot be obtained through central agreements. Cooperation between employers and different employee groups is based on economically motivated collaboration, not on institutionalized and/or ideologically motivated social obligations. Even without public intervention, this leads to the "microcooperativism" (Streeck, 1991) constituted by the rational self-interest o f the social partners in employment, wages, skilling, working conditions. This ten dency, which has been described in the highly developed countries during the past decade, can be identified in some spheres o f the Hungarian economy as well. Thus, within the Hungarian system o f labour relations, highly heterog enous firm-level configurations resulting from the multiform presence o f par ticipation are becoming o f crucial importance. Unified and centralized models o f labour relations are important to establish a stable political background, and so are norms regulating the relationship between the social partners, but their role in orienting firm-level labour relations should not be overestimated.
